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Over the last few years, many studies have emphasized the importance of 
social capital in economic progress and development of societies. In 
particular, sustainable development requires more cohesive and peaceful 
societies. This study attempts to assess how the armed conflict in Côte 
d’Ivoire has weakened the country’s social fabric and how to restore it. 
Cross-sectional data obtained from a survey are used to address this issue.  
We use measures of trust and associational participation as proxies for 
social capital. The empirical findings reveal a renewed interest for 
associations. They also give support to the eroding trust between people. The 
loss of trust poses a true challenge in terms of reconciliation and of 
rebuilding social cohesion.  
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Introduction 
Thanks to its relative economic prosperity, Côte d’Ivoire was for a long time 
one of Africa's most stable countries. For decades after its independence in 
Coppright © IAARR, 2009: www.afrrevjo.com  159 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
1960, the country enjoyed religious and ethnic harmony and showed 
remarkable political stability. All that changed on December 24, 1999, when 
rebels overthrew the government in the country’s first military coup. Since 
that time, the political agenda has been dominated by political and social 
tensions. This situation has culminated on September 19, 2002 in a war 
which divided the country in two and escalated into the country's worst crisis. 
The south is under government control, and the north is held by the rebels. 
The conflict has added to an already bewildering pattern of population 
displacements. More than 1,300, 000 peoplehave been forced to flee the 
fighting and over 2, 000 were killed. Today, although the fighting have 
officially ceased, the main players in the conflict have so far failed to find a 
political solution. The presidential election initially scheduled for October 
2005 was postponed. The political upheaval deeply affected the economic 
outlook. In 2003 and 2004, real GDP recorded negative growth of 
respectively -1.6 percent and -1.7 percent (OECD, 2006). Whatever the 
government in place, it will have the priority goals of Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, and Reintegration. After implementing this program, the 
government will also have to consider as a priority the rebuilding of the 
country economic prosperity. However, this economic goal cannot be 
achieved without social reconciliation. 
 
Indeed, besides traditional economic factors which determine the prosperity 
of a country, it is recognized today that factors related to the nature of the 
social bond play a decisive role: the diversity and the quality of the social 
fabric, the feeling of attachment of the citizens with certain values and norms 
such as cooperation, solidarity, and mutual trust. These elements received an 
increasing attention during these last years through the concept of social 
capital which conceptualizes these various aspects of the social bond as a 
form of capital.  
 
Following Putnam (1993) and Coleman (1988), a growing body of research 
has examined the phenomenon of social capital in an attempt to define the 
concept and to describe how it may influence and improve the development 
process. Efforts have also been made to develop indicators for measuring 
social capital and to improve recommendations on how to encourage and 
support it. As mentioned by Colletta and Cullen (2002), few studies, 
however, have actually analyzed how social capital interacts with violent 
conflict, an important issue considering the rise in the frequency of civil 
conflicts in African countries and the importance of social capital for social 
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and economic development (Knack and Keffer, 1997; Grootaert, 1998; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Anyanwu, 2002).  
What is the impact of the Ivorian conflict on social capital? Does the conflict 
divide population and undermine deeply social cohesion? What forms of 
social capital have emerged as result of the war? Do these forms of social 
capital contribute to reinforce national cohesion? Gaining a better 
understanding of these issues is relevant for policy-making purposes. Thus 
the main objective of this study is to assess how much the ivorian conflict has 
depleted the social capital. Using data obtained from a survey, we explore 
empirically the effect of the conflict on different indicators of social capital, 
such as the prevalence of trust among population and the membership in 
social organizations. We also examine the ways in which government can 
foster the socially cohesive relationships necessary for conflict prevention, 
reconciliation, reconstruction and development.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the 
literature on social capital relevant to its relationship with conflict and social 
cohesion, we describe the data used in the empirical section. We then present 





Social capital is the key theme of this paper. It is one of the social resources 
that are relevant for understanding society cohesiveness and community 
prosperity. The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we motivate the 
indicators of social capital used in the empirical section by exploring the 
definition of social capital. Second, we analyze its relationship with conflict 
and social cohesion.  
 
 
During the last few years, economists have taken a growing interest in social 
capital. This concept is spreading in economic and social literature. The 
definition of social capital in this literature is not uniform. Many of 
definitions draw from Coleman (1988), who defines social capital as the 
relations among persons that enable them to cooperate in the pursuit of 
mutual objectives. Starting from this definition, some researchers have 
emphasized the role of informal microinstitutional features of communities or 
groups. Putnam (1993, p.167), who drew the concept from Coleman, defined 
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social capital as “those features of social organizations, such as trust, norms 
and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions” or as “features of social life – networks, norms and trust 
–that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives” (Putnam 1995a, p. 664). Putnam is concerned not only with the 
role of social capital in economic development but also with its role in 
forming democratic societies. Thus he equates social capital with the quality 
and intensity of individual membership in social and professional 
associations. An alternative definition is provided by Huysman and Wulf 
(2004), who wrote, “Social capital refers to network ties of goodwill, mutual 
support, shared language, shared norms, social trust, and a sense of mutual 
obligation that people can derive value from. It is understood as the glue that 
holds together social aggregates such as networks of personal relationships, 
communities, regions, or even whole nations” (p. 1). As it appears from these 
definitions, all use of the concept of social capital refers to social norms. 
Social norms provide a form of informal social control that obviates the 
necessity for more formal, institutionalized legal sanctions. They are 
generally unwritten but commonly understood formulas both for determining 
what patterns of behaviour are expected in a given social context and for 
defining what forms of behaviour are valued or socially approved (Onyx and 
Bullen, 2000).  
 
A broader definition of social capital includes not only these 
microinstitutional features but also the rule and regulations of the 
marketplace, political institutions, and development actors, which have an 
impact on social capital environment facing actors at the local level. Collier 
(1998) disaggregates social capital into government and civil social capital. 
Government social capital refers to government institutions that influence 
people’s ability to cooperate for mutual benefit. The most commonly 
analyzed of these institutions are the enforceability of contracts, the rule of 
law, and the extent of civil liberties permitted by the state. Civil social capital 
refers to those forms of social interactions that are not directly dependent on 
government rule system. It encompasses common values, norms, informal 
networks, and associational memberships that affect the ability of individuals 
to work together to achieve common goals. Narayan (1999) emphasizes the 
importance of inclusion of the state in social capital analysis examining the 
relationship between state and society. She argues that analysis must be not 
only centred on civic engagement, characterized by inclusive ties that link 
different individuals and groups or communities, but also on the effectiveness 
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of the state. As definition of social capital, she writes that “Social capital is 
the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social 
relations, social structures, and society’s institutional arrangements which 
enables its members to achieve theirs individual and community objectives” 
(Narayan, 1999 p. 50). In others words, the vitality of community networks 
and civil society is largely the product of the political, legal and institutional 
environment. The capacity of social groups to act in their collective interest 
depends on the quality of the formal institutions under which they reside 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). The World Bank (1998) uses a similar 
definition: social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable 
collective action. It refers to the institutions, relationships and norms that 
shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions.  
 
While those definitions share common elements, their exact meaning is 
imprecise and thus obtaining a single true measure of social capital is 
problematic. The difficulty lies on the fact that social capital comprises 
various social elements that promote individual and collective action. 
Nevertheless, empirical researchers have identified useful indicators based on 
two core elements of social capital: trust among community members and 
people’s participation in social organizations- that is in informal and formal 
associations and networks. As their names implies, theses two indicators are 
proxies for various aspects of social capital. No single indicator can embrace 
the whole spectrum of social capital, but these indicators as a group provide 
information about various dimensions of the concept. Trust entails a 
willingness to take risks in a social context based on a sense of confidence 
that others will respond as expected and will act in mutually supportive way. 
It refers to the confidence that a partner will not exploit the vulnerabilities of 
the other (Gambetta, 1988). As described by Fukuyama (1995, p.153), “trust 
arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to 
create expectations of regular and honest behaviour”. Reciprocity, civic duty, 
and moral obligation are essential to a successful and stable society and are 
the behaviours that should emanate from a thriving civil society. Generalized 
trust is based on a set of ethical habits and reciprocal moral obligations 
internalized by members of a community. High trust societies can do with 
fewer regulations and coercive enforcement mechanisms. Putnam views 
memberships in horizontal associations as a source of trust and of social ties 
conductive to democracy and economic performance. People engage with 
others through a variety of lateral associations. The underlying idea is that 
social capital cannot be generated by individuals acting on their own in 
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isolation. It depends on a proclivity for sociability, a capacity to form new 
associations and to cooperate within the terms of reference they establish 
(Fukuyama, 1995). Several empirical studies have used theses indicators and 
shown that social capital is linked to a variety of social and economic 
outcomes such as better health (House et al. 1988), lower crime rates 
(Lederman et al., 2002), education (Coleman, 1988), more labor market 
options (Burt, 1997), human well-being and poverty alleviation (Collier, 
1998; Narayan and Pritchett 1999), economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 
1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Helliwell and Putnam, 1995a) and government 
performance (Putnam 1993, 1995b; Easterly and Levine, 1997). 
 
Gittell and Vidal (1998) have coined the terms ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ to 
describe the different levels of social capital in communities. According to 
them, bonding social capital is "the type that brings closer together people 
who already know each other well", and bridging social capital is "the type 
that brings together people or groups who previously did not know each other 
well" (p.15). In this sense, bonding social capital includes all resources that 
people can obtain from within-group ties, while bridging social capital refers 
to resources that people can gain from their ties with people from the outside 
(Adler  and Kwon 2002). In a later work, Putnam (2000) has made the same 
distinction, defining ‘bridging social capital’ as bonds of connectedness that 
are formed across diverse social groups (civil rights movements and 
ecumenical religious organisations), whereas ‘bonding social capital’ 
cements only homogenous groups such as family members and close friends. 
The idea of bridging social capital is not new. Granovetter (1973) also 
suggests that weak ties were an important resource in making possible 
mobility opportunities. He coined the terms “strong” and “weak ties” to 
describe the various networks and their usefulness in job-seeking practices.  
Access to individuals outside one’s close circle provides access to non-
redundant information, resulting in benefits such as employment connections. 
These loose connections are referred to as “weak ties”. Within social 
networks, the existence of gaps- i.e. the absence of direct links among all 
participants- between connected individuals can actually increase the 
efficiency of information flows within the larger network. Burt (2000) refers 
to these gaps in social networks as “structural holes”. The structural holes 
argument is that social capital is created by a network in which people can 
broker connections between otherwise disconnected segments. Networks 
operate more efficiently when structural holes exist, often by supporting the 
new information and ideas between sub-groups. Such a process allows 
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information to flow from one group in which it is common knowledge to 
another where it is new and may be more valuable. Thus, individuals with 
contact networks rich in structural holes are the individuals who know about, 
have a hand in, and exercise control over, more rewarding opportunities. 
Although relationships within and between communities and organizations 
are crucial for collective action and for social and economic change, 
Woolcock (2002) also stresses the need to foster relationships with formal 
institutions beyond the community, that he terms ‘linking’ social capital. He 
asserts that strong relationships with formal institutions are instrumental in 
that they allow groups to access resources, ideas, and information from 
institutions of power.  
 
This distinction is useful in highlighting how social capital may not always 
be beneficial for society as a whole. It gives insight to policymakers to more 
effectively build a society where economic prosperity and social order are 
likely.  When attempting to identify measures for policy and operational 
recommendations from our study, it is important to examine the relation of 
social capital to the cohesiveness of a society in order to better investigate 
how within-group and across-group ties are affected by conflict and the role 
social capital can play in a conflict-ridden environment. In a definition 
proposed by Berkman and Kawachi (2000), quoted in Colletta and Cullen 
(2002, p. 282), social cohesion shares common elements with social capital. 
It refers not only to the absence of latent conflict whether in the form of 
inequalities, or political or ethnic polarization, but also to the presence of 
strong social bonds measured by levels of trust and norms of reciprocity, and 
the abundance of associations that bridge social divisions. In Putnam’s view, 
social capital is about social cohesion, the glue which holds a community 
together. Cohesive order requires trust based on social networks, solidarity 
and common aims and objectives (Forrest and Kearns 2001). Through strong 
social networks which link families, friends, neighbours, workmates, and 
acquaintances, a climate is created where people have a deeper sense of 
belonging, more trust and a greater willingness to assist others, including 
foreigners. These webs of relationships, especially when they link people 
from different backgrounds, are what hold a community together. The more 
bonding and bridging horizontal social capital link with vertical social 
capital, the more likely it will be that a society is cohesive and thus possesses 
the inclusive institutions necessary for managing conflicts. But when a 
society’s social capital inheres mainly in primary social groups disconnected 
from one another, the more powerful groups attempt to dominate the state, to 
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the exclusion of others groups. Such societies are characterized by latent 
conflict (Narayan, 1999). In short, lack of bridging and linking networks in a 
multicultural society can be restrictive to social cohesion and economic 
development efforts (Woolcock, 2002). 
 
Civil conflict weakens the social cohesion. It deeps social cleavages between 
communities, undermines interpersonal and communal group trust, and 
destroys norms and values that underlie cooperation and collective action for 
the common good. Civil conflict also transforms social capital in favour of 
bonding relationships. Different works have analyzed the connection between 
social relation and conflict experiences. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
investigated the factors that can determine the propensity to trust. They found 
that trust can be reduced by a recent history of traumatic experiences. In a 
case study from Rwanda, Colletta and Cullen (2002) showed that the conflict 
negatively affected most manifestations of horizontal social capital, such as 
exchange, mutual assistance and trust. It also has affected vertical 
relationships between the communities. We will now examine the onslaught 
of the Ivorian conflict on social capital. 
 
Data source and statistical analysis 
In this section, we first describe the data and measure on social capital used 
in the empirical analysis. And then, we present an empirical model to 
examine demographic determinants of social capital. 
 
Data source and measures 
The data considered in this paper come from a survey conducted by ENSEA 
in June 2004. This survey took place two year after the conflict and was 
designed to study the impact of the conflict on households living conditions. 
Detailed demographic and economic information was collected in order to 
address this issue. The data were collected by administering a uniform 
questionnaire to heads of households. Another questionnaire was specially 
administered to household members who were displaced. On the other hand, 
the survey also attempted to assess the impact of the crisis on social capital. It 
provides the primary source for Côte d’Ivoire evidence on trust and social 
relations. The limited resources available did not make possible a sampling 
framework such that the study would be representative of the country at the 
national level. The survey was confined to Yopougon, one of the most 
cosmopolite areas of the country. Yopougon is a district of the capital 
Abidjan which is located in the South of the country and was controlled by 
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the government. At the beginning of the conflict, many people migrated 
toward the South in particular to Abidjan. In 2003, Yopougon accounts for 
25.28 percent of the total population of Abidjan, according to the National 
Institute of Statistic. 
 
A total of 1847 households were selected and surveyed by face-to-face 
interviews. The sample was selected according to a two-stage sampling 
design. At the first stage of the design, Primary Sampling Units (PSU) were 
based on territorial divisions called “district of census”. PSU were selected 
with probability proportional to size. The total of PSU selected at the first 
stage is of 20. At the second stage, households were randomly selected using 
an equal probability sampling. Because of missing values, the final basic 
sample contains 1 805 households. Although the survey cannot be considered 
representative in the strict sense of the term, it provides very useful 
information on the way in which the crisis has affected people living 
conditions and social relations. The data analysis is restricted to the heads of 
households and results might be quite different for a head of household than 
for the other members of the household. 
 
The definitions and measures of social capital used in the survey focus on 
people’s participation in social networks and trust. In line of the 
aforementioned empirical studies, trust and social participation are seen as 
dimensions of social capital. The survey asked respondents whether they 
participated in associations. The question we use to measure group 
membership reflects the propensity to participate in different types of 
associations. Associational membership included professional associations, 
mutuals, political associations, religions organizations, youth groups, 
sporting clubs and cultural activities. Selected respondents were asked about 
their current and retrospective membership in those organizations. The 
survey did not record the amount of time individually spent in association. 
For each association, however, respondents have indicated their degree of 
involvement following an ordered variable with four classes. Specifically, 
respondents may participate as leader, very active member, sometime active, 
or not active. The first two categories concern individuals who take on 
certain responsibilities as managers or committee members in associations. 
 
Trust is an abstract concept that is difficult to measure empirically because it 
may mean different things to different people. The survey focused both on 
generalized trust and on the extent of trust that exists in the context of 
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associational participation. The generalized trust question focused on 
responses to the question: “Generally speaking, do you think that most 
people can be trusted?” Group trust index is then calculated as the percentage 
of respondents who agree with the statement that “most people can be 
trusted”. In order to assess change in trust level, respondents were also asked 





We are interested in how different characteristics can explain respondent 
behaviour. Since the focus of this work is on explaining social capital 
behaviour, we rely mainly on propensity to trust and participation in social 
groups. To study these decisions, we use a bivariate probit model. This model 
allows for explicit correlation between the error terms of the two equations 
and it is usually expressed in terms of continuous latent variable representing 
propensity, utility or preferences. It can be described as follows. Consider an 









* >=+= β        (2) 
 
where equation (1) represents the propensity of single agents to trust and 
equation (2) represents the decision to participate in associations. Assume 
that ie1  and ie2  are normally distributed with means of zero and standard 
deviations of 1, and that ρ  is the correlation between these two error terms. 
We do not observe *iT and
*
iA , only the signs, coded as above. The 
correlation coefficient ρ  could be interpreted as estimates of the dispersion 
of the unobserved heterogeneity in the behaviours.  
 
The rationale for using a bivariate probit model as opposed to estimating two 
separate equations is that the propensity to trust and the decision to engage in 
social organizations are undoubtedly linked, and ignoring a priori this mutual 
dependence can lead to biased parameter estimates (Green, 1997). For 
instance, an agent’s desire for enjoying relational good, which is presumably 
unobservable and therefore included in the error terms, might be correlated 
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with both the trust and the decision of whether to joint groups. Putnam 
(1993) has emphasized the propensity of associations to generate trust, social 
ties and civicness among people: “the denser such networks in a community, 
the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit” 
(Putnam 1993, p. 173). Joint estimation of trust and membership decisions 
explicitly takes into account this correlation. 
 
The set of independent variables that might influence social capital includes 
sex, marital status, age, religion and occupational status (occupied/non-
occupied). Education is also relevant. More educated individuals may be 
expected to be more trusting and socially embedded. The positive effect of 
education on trust and membership might occur because more educated 
people associate with other more educated people who are, for some reason, 
more trustworthy. Alternatively, education might create individual social 
capital by raising social skills or because high status increases the ability to 
reward and punish others (Glaeser and al. 2000). Also included are control 
dummies variables indicating the ethnic group of the respondent. These 
variables are included to control for possible cultural differentials in the 
involvement in social activities and trust behaviour. Côte d'Ivoire has more 
than 60 ethnic groups, usually classified into five principal divisions: the 
Akans (east and center, including Lagoon peoples of the southeast); the 
Krous (southwest); the Southern Mandés (west); the Northern Mandés 
(northwest) and the Gurs or Voltaiques (northeast). Theses five ethno-
linguistic groupings are completed by the foreigners who come from others 
countries. We introduce a dummy variable labelled “change in the 
occupational status after the conflict” to control for work-related problems. 
 
Finally, the model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The 
next section provides discussion on the empirical results. 
 
Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis. Before turning to 
the results of the bivariate probit model, we consider descriptive statistics 




One of the most outstanding aspects of the crisis is the renewed interest of 
people for associations. Whereas 50.09 percent of surveyed reported taking 
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part in associations before the events of September 2002, the fraction of 
participants jumps to 63.8 percent two years later (table 1). The main aim of 
these regroupings is to develop solidarity between the members. They are 
also based on the expression of a will of collaboration and tightening the 
bonds between people sharing same culture and sometimes same political 
vision. To identify change in associational participation, Mc Nemar non 
parametric test was carried out. The reported p-value indicates that difference 
is significant, that is people more participate in associations after the conflict 
than before. 
 
Compared to previous studies give us instructive information. On this point, 
it is important to recall that an investigation led in 1979 in Abidjan by 
Delpech (1983) estimated at 70 percent the householders who participated in 
associations. In 2000, associational participation was estimated at about 
52.61 percent for Abidjan (Keho, 2006). Thus, there is a substantial 
downward trend in associational participation from 1979 to 2002. Can one 
interpret this downward trend as a direct consequence of the long period of 
economic crisis or a fold around the nuclear family, or the demonstration of a 
will of individualization and independence with respect to the community? 
 
One can observe a renewed interest for collective regroupings after 2002. Is it 
a sign of a great freedom or an expression of a democratic projection? It is 
difficult to give clear response to this question since the difference observed 
here might be driven by many factors independent from or correlated with 
conflict. 
 
It is important to balance this vision of associations. Indeed, associations 
cannot be all accredited a priori of good values. Certain associations, in 
particular associations of development, which gather people from the same 
village, area or country, carry on their activities on spaces which are not 
likely to disturb political and social order. Conversely, when associations 
take the form of groups support to political parties, they become often time 
dangerous. Animated by a political and ideological fanaticism, they are 
carrying disorder, division, hatred and exclusion. In fact, the density of 
associative space is not most important, what counts for development is the 
configuration of this space. The preceding analytical framework shows that 
when associations form groups disconnected from one another, society is 
subject to latent conflict which can be expressed through a rebellion, a 
questioning of the social, economic and political order. The downside of 
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social capital is acknowledged by many authors (see Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes and Landolt (1996); Portes 1998; Fafchamps and 
Minten 1999; Colletta and Cullen 2002). Portes and Landolt (1996) and 
Portes (1998) outline the downside social capital as nepotism or exclusion of 
outsiders from certain occupations, or restrictions on individual freedoms and 
a downward levelling of norms. In Rwanda the political and economic elite 
used identity to mobilize and contort social capital in order to achieve their 
own ends (Colletta and Cullen, 2002). 
 
We now examine the fields of engagement. The associational involvement is 
very clearly dominated by associations of village, area or country of origin, 
since they account for 39.5 percent of membership. The level of people 
belonging to political associations increased from 12 percent to 16 percent 
over the two periods. This visible change in associational participation and 
particularly in political commitment can be explained by the context. As the 
conflict was at its beginning, country and communities fell prey to hatred and 
violence. Then, external bridging ties were being supplanted by integrative 
bonding relationships. The nature and causes of the conflict were 
transforming and strengthening certain types of social capital, mainly more 
community-oriented bonds, integrative forms of social capital increases 
within communities fighting for survival and identity.  
 
Table 2 compares the levels of social capital across different subpopulations. 
It paints an interesting picture of who is and who is not likely to participate in 
associations and to trust others. As this table evidences it, the level of 
associational participation is generally high across demographic groups. We 
can, however, notice substantial variation in responses by group. Thus, 
associational participation varies from 58.5 among women to 65.2 percent 
among men. Comparison across religious groups highlights some significant 
differences. Catholics are more likely to participate in associations. The 
lower level of social involvement is recorded among Muslims. The degree of 
involvement appears to vary positively with the level of education: the more 
people are educated the more they are likely to belong to associations. 
Regarding the ethnic group, associational participation is much higher among 
Akans and southern ethnics (Krous and Southern Mandés).  
 
Trust question depicts a quite different pattern. Looking at table 3, we notice 
that people propensity to trust others is low: in the whole sample, only 20.2 
percent of people reported that “most people can be trusted”. Protestants fall 
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in the group that has the highest score on trust, follow Catholics and 
Muslims. Others religious and no religious people are less likely to report 
that “most people can be trusted”. Only 13 and 15.4 percent, respectively, of 
others religious and non-religious people think that “most people can be 
trusted”. These scores are low compared with 23.7 percent within Protestants 
and 20.6 percent within Catholics.  
 
Ivorians are less trusting than foreigners. While 28 percent of foreigners 
think that “most people can be trusted”, it is about less than 23 percent of 
Ivorians who say that they are trusting. The conflict has undermined trust 
within nationals and between nationals and foreigners. The asymmetric in the 
propensity to trust people can receive explanations with reference to the 
nature and causes of the conflict. In the initial months of the conflict, voices 
had risen to spread hate propaganda against political opposition members, 
northern Ivorians, and foreign communities coming from neighbouring 
countries, who were generally suspected to be supporting the northern-based 
rebel movement. They were harassed, assaulted, arbitrarily arrested, detained, 
and, in many instances, executed based on their real or imputed ethnic and 
political affiliation. Given the social and political deterioration, Southern 
Ivorians mistrusted northern Ivorians and foreigners.  
 
Trust has not been totally destroyed. There are some people who are 
optimistic. According to the responses displayed in table 3 below, there are 
about 52 percent of respondents who still think that trust has unchanged. 
Conversely, about 41 percent of people perceive a substantial degradation in 
trust as result of conflict. Results exhibit a similar trend across groups.  
 
Mean response rates by demographic groups confound many different effects 
in the data. We attempt now to identify these separate effects with bivariate 




The following table presents bivariate probit estimates for our basic model. 
The first column displays estimates of the associational participation 
equation, the second column display estimates of the trust equation and the 
third column indicates the marginal effects. Personal characteristics are 
generally poor predictors of trust behaviour; however they seem to play 
significant roles in the decision to participate in associations.   
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Regarding the estimates, table 4 indicates that involvement in associations 
increases as respondents get older. That adults are more likely to take part in 
associational activities is certainly due to their occupational status. Those 
who are working are more likely to undertake associational activities 
through, for instance, professional associations. The number of persons in the 
household exerts a positive impact on membership. Thus, people in the large 
households are more likely to be involved in associations. Membership 
increases with the level of education, especially for people with graduate 
level of study. Well-educated people exhibit more associational involvement 
than others, because of their higher level of economic activity. This suggests 
that the conflict did not diminish the willingness of more educated people to 
work together. This finding also indicates that human capital and social 
capital are complementary. The ethnic dummies, on the other hand, appear to 
have significant effect on the probability of taking part in association but not 
on trust behaviour. Results suggest that religion, especially Catholicism and 
Protestantism, correlate with trust. Indeed, Catholics and Protestants seem to 
be more trusting. Education does not influence trust behaviour. In the context 
of Ivorian crisis, more educated people as well as those who are not tend to 
have similar judgement toward others. Overall, the estimates of the bivariate 
probit model are in line with previous descriptive statistics. 
 
The ancillary parameter measuring the correlation of the residuals from the 
two equations indicates that the two equations are positively associated. An 
interpretation of this correlation between associational participation and trust 
refers to the positive impact of membership on the extent of personal 
relations. People who experience more social contacts will be more trusting. 
Another interpretation concerns the presence of unobserved variables that are 
source of heterogeneity. 
 
Although our empirical analysis takes into consideration a number of 
demographic variables, there are still some individual characteristics that 
cannot be observed in the data collected and that may be significant 
predictors of respondent’s behaviour. Those variables could be a feeling of 
concern about others or a capacity to manage interpersonal contacts. It is well 
acknowledged that associational membership such as friendship relations 
involve a certain mastering of social relations technology (Bell, 1991), and 
especially that of language (Héran, 1988). Personal experience of conflict and 
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the length of continuous stay in the current village/neighbourhood are also 
significant determinants of both participation and level of generalized trust.  
 
Conclusion 
Over the last few years, many studies have emphasized that social capital is 
important to economic progress and the development of societies. 
Sustainable development requires more cohesive and peaceful societies. In 
this article we have attempted to examine how the situation of conflict in 
Côte d’Ivoire has impacted its social fabric. Our empirical analysis has made 
use of data from a survey for this purpose. We used measures of trust and 
people’s participation in associations as proxies for social capital. The main 
results suggest what follows. First, our empirical analysis evidence 
substantial changes in social capital. The postconflict forms of structural 
social capital do not differ greatly from those that existed before the conflict. 
The findings reveal, however, an increase in associational commitment, 
especially in political associations and in those that gather people from same 
ethnic group or area. That is not an encouraging fact, since bridging ties and 
trust between people have been weakened. Moreover, about two individuals 
out of five perceive substantial degradation in trust as result of conflict. 
Second, human capital and associational membership are found to be 
complementary. This suggests that the conflict has not canceled the proclivity 
of people to work together. Conversely, education does not seem to have 
significant effect on trust behaviour. In the context of Ivorian crisis, more 
educated people as well as those who are not tend to have similar judgement 
toward others.  
 
The findings have important policy implications for policy makers. The loss 
of trust between people poses an important challenge in terms of rebuilding 
national cohesion. The findings show that efforts to rebuild cohesive society 
in Côte d’Ivoire are needed. Despite the renewed interest for associations, 
social ties are not sufficiently inclusive to counterbalance hatred and 
suspicion generated by the war. The challenge is to promote social 
development by encouraging social relationships that cross ethnic and 
political affiliation. Of course, this does not deny that bonding is not 
important. It is also necessary to preserve bonding ties that serve as the 
foundation of societal life.  
 
In fact, social capital is a double-edged sword with regard to conflict and 
development. Abundance of social capital is not necessarily good. Indeed, 
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social capital has the potential for strengthening social cohesion or spurring 
social fragmentation. Social capital is good for individuals as long as it 
provides mutual aid and protection in time of crisis. At country level, it is 
constructive if it is about bridging between groups. However, it becomes 
‘’bad’’ for country as a whole when it is perverted to mobilize groups such as 
young people or women to instigate violence and undermine social cohesion. 
Social and economic policies should have to account for this downside of 
social capital. 
 
In this context, inclusive state institutions and conflict management 
mechanisms need to be encouraged for strengthening social cohesion, 
managing diversity, preventing predatory behaviour and conflict, and 
sustaining peace and development. Signs of steps in this direction have 
already emerged since the creation of the ministries for reconciliation, for 
solidarity and victims of war. Recent decentralization might encourage 
people participation in community projects. Community-based development 
approaches are attempting to create the space for development of social 
capital that goes beyond the boundaries of family, ethnic group or political 
parties.  Not only they reinforce cohesion within groups, they also link 
communities to the state. In addition, the type of social cohesion that should 
be beneficial to Côte d’Ivoire is trust between nationals and foreigners. The 
latter, and more precisely immigrants from bordering countries have played 
important contribution to the relative prosperity of the country. It is important 
that they are well integrated. It is of this integration that depends the stability 
of the country. 
 
Further research is needed in order to reach a better understanding of all 
social impacts of Ivorian conflict. A more representative survey would be 
needed to encompass people opinions about the crisis and their proposals that 
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Table 1: Associational Participation before and Two Year after the Conflict 
 Before After p-value* 
Overall participation  50.09 63.80 0.000 
       Mutuals 38.33 42.77 0.000 
       Professional associations 12.40 13.68 0.000 
       NGO 1.88 2.60 0.000 
       Sporting clubs 6.31 6.70 0.016 
       Youth groups 5.59 6.70 0.000 
       Neighborhood connections 11.24 14.55 0.000 
       Friends groups 6.58 8.14 0.000 
       Political associations 12.50 16.94 0.000 
Note: p-value for Mc Nemar test. 
  Source: Author computation from 2004 ENSEA Survey Data 
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Table 2: Distribution of Associational Participation and Trust by 
Demographic Groups 
Sample distribution 








that « most people 
can be trusted » (p-value) 
Overall sample 63.8  20.2  
Gender     
   Male 65.2  
 
0.014 20.5 0.526 
   Female 58.5 19.1 
Religion     





    Protestant 63.1 23.7 
    Muslim 51.3 20.1 
    Other religion 61.0 13.0 
    No religion 66.7 15.4 
Highest educational attainment     





      Primary school 58.6 20.1 
      Secondary    school 66.5 19.8 
      Higher  70.5 19.7 
Ethnic  group     





     Krou 67.6 21.0 
     Southern Mande  66.9 18.9 
     Northern Mande  53.7 19.4 
     Gur (Northern Voltaique) 60.5 22.4 
     Foreigners 35.6 28.0 
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Table 3: Opinion about Trust Pattern 
Sample distribution Degraded Unchanged Improved 
Total sample 41.2 52.7 6.1 
Gender    
   Male 40.5 
52.9 6.6 
   Female 43.5 51.9 4.6 
Highest educational attainment    
      No diploma 38.2 56.7 5.2 
      Primary school 37.4 57.6 5.0 
      Secondary    school 42.5 51.4 6.0 
      Higher  43.8 49.9 6.3 











Constant -0.934* (-4.36) 
-0.849* 
(-3.66)     - 
Gender    




Household size 0.029* (3.35) 
-0.003 
(-0.35) 0.001 (0.72) 
Age    


















Religion    
    Catholic 0.103 (1.01) 
0.241* 
(2.09) 0.054* (2.20) 
    Protestant -0.056 (-0.51) 
0.335* 
(2.74) 0.063* (2.23) 
    Muslim -0.109 (-0.81) 0.057 0.003 (0.10) 
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(0.38) 
    Other religion -0.165 (-0.97) 
-0.096 




      Primary school 0.111 (0.99) 
-0.073 
(-0.59) -0.007 (-0.27) 
      Secondary  school 0.246* (2.49) 
-0.095 
(-0.89) -0.002 (-0.08) 
      Higher level 0.316* (2.86) 
-0.111 
(-0.93) -0.002 (-0.07) 
Ethnic  group    
     Akans 0.684* (4.98) 
-0.348*  
(-2.42)    -0.021 (-0.75) 
     Krous 0.610*  (4.12) 
-0.241 
(-1.55)    -0.013 (-0.42) 
     Southern Mandés  0.620*  (3.66) 
-0.272 
(-1.51) -0.022 (-0.64) 
     Northern Mandés  0.452* (3.07) 
-0.220 
(-1.40)    -0.017(-0.57) 
     Gurs (Voltaiques) 0.559* (3.52)    
-0.11 (-
0.66)     0.008 (0.22) 
Occupational status 0.197** (1.90) 
0.084 
(0.72) 0.028 (1.33) 
Change in the 
occupational status after 
the conflict (yes/no) 0.041 (0.39) 
-0.065 
(-0.55) -0.009 (-0.41) 
Correlation coefficient 0.127*  (2.865)  
Log-likelihood -2001.469  
Sample size 1805  
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. * (**) indicates a statistical significance 
at 5% (10%).  
 
  Source: Author computation from 2004 ENSEA Survey Data 
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